Temple liberation must not lead to their privatisation

I have visited many temples where the priest worries about the next ritual, while the executive officer worries about enforcement of controls. One thinks in terms of Agama, tradition and the sanctity of the sanctum. The other thinks in terms of files, budgets and government orders. That quiet mismatch lies at the base of the debate over government control of Hindu religious institutions.

Two legitimate concerns

The ‘Free Hindu’ temples movement argues that a secular government has no business managing Hindu shrines, and that religious communities should enjoy autonomy over their own institutions. Its supporters point to unequal treatment compared with institutions of other faiths. Those defending oversight argue that state intervention has been necessary to prevent corruption, protect public endowments, promote social justice and ensure accountability.

Both sides have legitimate concerns. The question is not whether temples should be accountable — they must be. The question is who should manage them, who should regulate them, and to whom are they accountable.

1. How the state became the manager: Government involvement did not begin with independent India. Its roots lie in colonial rule. The British introduced Madras Regulation VII of 1817 to supervise religious endowments, withdrew from direct management through the Religious Endowments Act of 1863, and later created a statutory framework through the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927. Post independence, states like Andhra Pradesh (1987 Act), Telangana and Tamil Nadu (1959 Act) developed extensive systems where endowments departments control trustees, properties, finances and executive administration.

The central criticism is that in many cases, government involvement goes beyond regulation and extends into day-to-day management. Supervision to prevent wrongdoing is one thing; permanent administrative control is quite another.

Article 25 guarantees freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion, while Article 26 gives religious denominations the right to establish institutions, manage their own affairs in matters of religion, and administer property in accordance with law. At the same time, Article 25(2) permits the state to regulate secular activities associated with religion and to legislate for social welfare and reform, including opening public Hindu institutions to all classes of Hindus.

Autonomy advocates argue that Hindu temples face dedicated government departments exercising operational control, which is not generally imposed on other religious institutions. That demand for a consistent, principled approach deserves serious consideration, even if comparisons with Articles 29-30 and Waqf Boards need constitutional precision.

Their three concerns are assets and land, donations and accountability, and interference in religious practices. Temple property belongs to the institution and must be protected for the purposes for which it was endowed.

Devotees reasonably expect donations to support worship and legitimate charity, with transparent accounting. And the person deciding how worship is conducted must understand the Agama framework governing that temple.

The case for regulation

Supporters of oversight also have serious arguments.

Before statutory regulation, some wealthy temples were controlled by hereditary trustees and powerful families, with mismanagement and exclusion of disadvantaged communities. Large institutions like Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams also need complex administration for pilgrims, sanitation, security and disaster management. Surplus revenues can legitimately support smaller temples, if authorised by law and transparently accounted for. These are arguments for effective regulation, not for permanent government management of every temple.

Temple autonomy cannot become a licence to restore hereditary privilege, caste discrimination or social exclusion. In Seshammal (1972), the Supreme Court upheld abolition of hereditary succession to the office of Archaka, distinguishing secular appointment from religious functions. In Adi Saiva (2015), it was held that appointments must respect Agama prescriptions, while exclusion based simply on caste or birth cannot claim constitutional protection. In Shirur Mutt (1954), the Court held that the state may regulate financial and administrative matters, but cannot take over religious affairs under the guise of regulation. In simple terms, the state can audit the accounts, but it cannot rewrite the rituals. In Chidambaram (2014), it held that intervention to remedy proven maladministration cannot become permanent, and administration must be restored once the reasons for takeover are addressed.

In Padmanabhaswamy (2020), it recognised the Travancore royal family’s shebaitship but provided for structured governance with an administrative committee chaired by a district judge. Tradition and accountability need not be mutually exclusive.

The way forward

Simply removing control without an alternative would be irresponsible. Temple liberation must not lead to privatisation of temples.

Temples should move gradually towards autonomous statutory trusts with spiritual heads, Agama experts, devotee representatives and independent professionals in law, finance and heritage. Active politicians should not dominate boards, and hereditary claims should not automatically guarantee control.

India needs a federated approach, not a national model, because Shaiva, Vaishnava and Shakta traditions differ. Autonomy must still mean published audited accounts, digital mapping of properties, and traceability of every rupee to a legitimate religious, administrative or charitable purpose.

Conclusion-From management to trusteeship

A secular state should neither favour nor discriminate against any religion. Freedom from government control cannot mean freedom from scrutiny, nor can tradition become a shield for corruption or discrimination. The temple is not a government office, a private estate or a political prize. It is a sanctuary held in trust for the deity, the devotee and the community. The state must protect that trust, but it should not become its permanent manager. The goal should be religious autonomy with constitutional accountability, community ownership with social inclusion, and tradition supported by professional administration. The temple belongs neither to the government nor to a privileged few. Its administrators are custodians, not owners.

(The author is a retired IAS Officer)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Srinivasulu Dasari