Sanchar Saathi’s Mandatory Rollout Sparks Privacy Concerns Across India

Government’s decision to mandate Sanchar Saathi on every smartphone raises strong privacy concerns due to the app’s extensive access and system-level control.
The Indian digital ecosystem has been shaken by two major government directives issued in just 48 hours. After the order mandating SIM-binding for WhatsApp and other messaging platforms, a new instruction now requires every smartphone—existing and new—to carry the Sanchar Saathi app. This government-developed tool, designed primarily to help track stolen mobile devices, will soon be unavoidable for every phone user in the country.
As per the order, smartphone makers must ensure the app is installed on all devices sold in India within the next 90 days. An additional 30 days has been allotted for companies to submit proof of compliance, placing full implementation at 120 days from now. The move has predictably ignited a storm on social media, where discussions have split into two camps: supporters calling it a user-friendly safety measure, and critics labelling it as the beginning of state-backed digital surveillance.
To understand the debate, it’s important to look at what the Sanchar Saathi app actually does—and what it demands. The app is currently available on Android and iOS, but it performs far more extensive operations on Android due to the platform’s inherently more flexible permission framework.
On Android, Version 1.5 of Sanchar Saathi requests broad access, including:
— Call and SMS logs
— Ability to make and manage calls
— Permission to send SMS
— Access to photos, media, and files
— Full camera functionality
Beyond these, it also taps into several Android system processes, such as using the flashlight, running foreground services, preventing the phone from sleeping, controlling vibration, checking Google Play licenses, and accessing the network at all times.
To gauge whether these permissions pose risks, the app was reviewed using the MOB-SF APK analyser. While the tool classified the overall report as “GREEN,” indicating the app is safe enough for use, it did flag a few “dangerous” permission areas—most notably access to the camera and call logs. These are permission classes typically categorized as high-risk because they can reveal deeply personal data.
Does that make the app harmful? Not necessarily. Many apps require intrusive permissions to perform legitimate tasks. Sanchar Saathi’s core utility—reading IMEI numbers, enabling tracking, and helping recover stolen phones—naturally requires deeper access. On functionality alone, it cannot be branded as unsafe.
However, the concern lies not in what the app does today, but in what it could do tomorrow. By placing Sanchar Saathi as a preloaded, undeletable system app—similar to core OS components on Android or iOS—the government is granting it elevated privileges. Once embedded at this level, the app can be updated over time to add new capabilities, some of which may extend beyond its original intent.
This turns the debate into a matter of trust. Supporters argue the app empowers citizens by safeguarding devices. Critics warn of the potential misuse of such deep data access, especially when users are not allowed to disable or remove it.
In the end, the question confronting millions of Indian smartphone users is simple yet profound: Do you trust your government enough to let a mandatory, system-level app live permanently on your phone?




















