Life must be protected, not ‘pactually’ abandoned

Whether it is the Constitutional law or criminal law, suicide cannot be accepted under any circumstances. Life is for living. No one has the right to die, but rather a duty to live and let others live.

The recent Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeal affirms a crucial criminal law principle: surviving a suicide pact does not erase legal responsibility when one has facilitated the other’s death. The judgment, delivered by a bench of Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Manmohan, not only resolves a long-pending criminal dispute but also clarifies the jurisprudential position on abetment to suicide and the criminality inherent in mutual suicide arrangements.

Right to live under Article 21 cannot be extended to include ‘right to die’. This significant case presents a delicate intersection of criminal liability, medical evidence, and the State’s constitutional obligation to protect life under Article 21. Life is beautiful, whether killing herself or joining a lover, may be a thrilling cinema, but not in reality. In a pact of dying together, if both die, there may be no criminal case, but all those who abetted will be a criminal offence and culpable.

A beautiful heroine, Pratyusha, ended her life following a mutual agreement (?), while the surviving lover became a criminal.

At a broader constitutional level, the decision reinforces that the State’s duty is not merely to punish after death but to create legal and social conditions that discourage suicide, prevent emotional coercion, and protect the sanctity of life.

The tragedy of Prathyushya is therefore not only a criminal case but a societal warning: Love cannot justify self-destruction; despair cannot legalise death; and survival cannot absolve complicity. The law, ultimately, speaks with a humane yet firm voice: life is inviolable, and any pact to extinguish it invites both moral sorrow and legal consequence.

Analysis of the Prathyushya case:

The recent dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court in the 23-year-old case concerning the tragic death of the south Indian actress raises profound questions about criminal abetment, evidentiary evaluation, suicide prevention, and the legal culpability of a surviving partner in a suicide pact.

The judgment also emphasises evidentiary discipline, rejecting sensational claims unsupported by medical proof while upholding culpability grounded in established facts.

Love, opposition and a fatal pact:

It is again a story of love, opposition, and a fatal pact. The prosecution’s case, accepted by the courts, was that the actress and Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy were in a relationship despite opposition by his parents. In this emotionally charged setting, both allegedly consumed poison together. While she succumbed, he survived. He was thereafter convicted for: 1. Abetment to suicide; 2. Attempt to commit suicide

The trial court imposed five years’ imprisonment, later reduced to two years by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 2004. The surviving accused challenged the conviction, while the victim’s mother alleged rape, murder by strangulation, and inadequate sentencing.

The Supreme Court, after examining ocular and medical evidence, rejected allegations of rape and strangulation, holding that death was due to poisoning and that purchase of poison (neurontone) constituted abetment.

Survival as a liability!

The crucial legal principle reaffirmed by the Court is that a surviving partner in a mutual suicide pact can be legally culpable for abetment to suicide. This doctrine flows from Sections 107 and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalise instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid to commit suicide.

The law does not treat suicide pacts as romantic acts of shared despair but as legally culpable agreements that normalise self-destruction. Thus, survival does not imply innocence. It may instead expose a participant to enhanced criminal scrutiny.

A judicial reasoning:

The oral pronouncement of the bench outlines a layered evidentiary assessment:

•  Murder by strangulation ruled out
•  Overwhelming ocular and medical evidence proved poisoning
•  Rape allegations not established
•  Belated claims of rape and strangulation rejected
•  Accidental consumption defence disbelieved
•  Purchase of poison established abetment
•  Unprofessional post-mortem report criticised
•  Premature publication of medical findings condemned

These findings reflect the Court’s reliance on forensic consistency, contemporaneous evidence, and legal causation, rather than speculative allegations emerging decades later.

Distinction between attempted suicide and abetment:

Attempts to commit suicide historically attracted punishment under Section 309 IPC, though contemporary mental health jurisprudence treats survivors with compassion. However, when a survivor is shown to have actively enabled the other’s death, the law shifts focus from mental vulnerability to criminal complicity.

Thus:

Mere survival may invite therapeutic response, while survival with facilitation invites penal consequences

Romantic myth vs criminal reality:

Popular culture often portrays suicide pacts as tragic expressions of love. Criminal law rejects this romanticism for three reasons:

A. Suicide is not a private contract: A pact to die together cannot be legally validated because life is constitutionally protected, the State has an interest in preserving life, and consent cannot legalise self-destruction.

B. Power imbalance and emotional coercion: One partner may be more vulnerable. Emotional dependence can turn a “mutual pact” into subtle coercion.

C. Survival distorts the pact: If one dies and the other survives, the survivor’s role must be scrutinised: Was it equal participation, passive presence, or active facilitation? The law, therefore, presumes that survival coupled with preparatory acts (like procuring poison) may constitute abetment.

State’s duty to prevent suicide:

The constitutional guarantee of life under Article 21 imposes a positive obligation on the State:

To protect individuals from self-harm;

To regulate circumstances enabling suicide;

To penalise those who facilitate self-destruction

Suicide is not merely a private tragedy; it is a constitutional concern involving dignity, mental health, and social responsibility. Criminalising abetment ensures that despair is not converted into a shared criminal enterprise.

A doctrinal clarification:

This case reiterates a settled but often misunderstood principle-a suicide pact is not a shield against criminal liability.

Participation in planning, procuring means, or encouraging the act can constitute abetment if one partner dies. Thus, the law treats suicide pacts not as mutual consent but as shared participation in a legally prohibited act, where survival triggers accountability.

Media and medical evidence:

An important aspect of the case is the Court’s criticism of an “unprofessional” post-mortem report and premature publication of medical findings. This highlights two systemic concerns: Forensic evidence must be scientifically consistent and professionally verified; Media leaks of medical opinions can prejudice trials and distort public perception. By rejecting unsupported strangulation claims and relying on consistent ocular and medical evidence, the court reaffirmed the primacy of credible forensic science over sensational allegations.

Balancing compassion and accountability:

Modern jurisprudence recognises that suicide survivors may themselves be victims of mental distress. However, when evidence shows (a) Purchase of lethal substance, (b) Active facilitation, and (c) Knowledge of consequences, the law must respond not merely with sympathy but with accountability. The Supreme Court’s approach reflects a calibrated balance: Reject exaggerated allegations (rape, strangulation); Affirm proven criminal facilitation (purchase of poison); recognise the survivor’s culpability within evidentiary limits.

Evidentiary integrity:

The Supreme Court’s refusal to accept rape allegations demonstrates a commitment to evidentiary rigour. Criminal law cannot sustain convictions on delayed or unsupported claims. While sensitivity to victims is essential, judicial fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment thus balances compassion with legal certainty.

(The writer is Advisor, School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad)